Commercial open source software (COSS) products-privately developed software based on publicly available source code-represent a rapidly growing, multi-billion dollar market. A unique aspect of competition in the COSS market is that many open source licenses require firms to make certain enhancements public, creating an incentive for firms to free-ride on the contributions of others. This practice raises a number of puzzling issues. First, why should a firm further develop a product if competitors can freely appropriate these contributions? Second, how does a market based on freeriding produce products that effectively compete with similar products from proprietary software firms? Third, from a public policy perspective, does the mandatory sharing of enhancements raise or lower consumer surplus?
Introduction
Open source software is built through public collaboration and is distributed for free. The source code is published openly allowing others to modify and enhance it, in contrast to the traditional model of software where firms keep their source code private. 1 The free and open model has led to the increasing adoption of open source among consumers and firms, and has fundamentally altered the landscape of competition in the software market. Thus, some firms are able to free-ride on the contributions of others, a practice which Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer referred to as "a cancer that attaches itself in an intellectual property sense to everything it touches," (New York Times, 2003) .
The unique institutional arrangements discussed above raise a number of puzzling issues. First, why should a firm develop additional features for its product if competitors can freely appropriate these features for their products? Second, technology experts have pointed to cases where COSS products are of comparable or even higher quality than similar products produced by traditional, 1 Open source software should be distinguished from two other forms of freely available software. Some firms make their software available for free ("freeware") but do not make the source code available (e.g., Adobe Reader). Another form is voluntary open source, where a firm releases the source code but with strong restrictions on its use and redistribution. We do not consider these cases because the strategic issues involved differ significantly from those faced by COSS firms.
2 Popular examples of open source software include the Linux operating system, Firefox browser, OpenOffice, Apache Web Server, SugarCRM, and MySQL, among others. See http://www.sourceforge.net for a web-based repository of open source applications. 3 We focus on the two types of licenses most common and relevant to the COSS industry: the GNU General Public License (http://www.gnu.org) and the Berkeley Software Distribution License (http://www.opensource. org/licenses/bsd-license.php). See Laurent (2004) for more discussion.
closed source software firms (Dedeke, 2009) . How does a market where firms face a strong incentive to free-ride produce high quality products? Third, does the mandatory sharing of features always result in the creation of fewer open source features? Fourth, when are firms and consumers truly hurt by the "cancer" of free-riding, as Ballmer describes it?
Despite the growing importance of the COSS industry, there is little extant research examining firms' competitve strategies in this novel setting. To address these questions, we incorporate the unique aspects of this industry into a stylized model, and analyze the competitive strategies to shed light on these empirical puzzles.
We contribute to the literature both along a substantive dimension and to a better understanding of spillover effects in signaling from a methodological viewpoint. From a substantive viewpoint, we demonstrate a rationale for why free-riding in an open source market is not destructive. Indeed, it can be beneficial to both consumers and firms. We investigate how free-riding in a market can result in firms developing high-quality products and how restrictive open source licenses can have a positive impact on consumer welfare. We also show that a license that forces firms to create open source may paradoxically reduce the amount of open source created. Methodologically, we contribute to the literature on signaling in the job market by extending the traditional model of Spence (1973) along two dimensions. First, the signals themselves have a "spillover" effect: developers' contributions can be appropriated even by a firm that does not hire them. Second, we consider an imperfectly competitive market where developers and firms share the surplus in a non-cooperative interaction that can influence the quantity of open source created.
We provide a brief overview of the model and then discuss our key results in more detail. Our model has two interacting markets: a product market consisting of COSS firms who sell software products to consumers, and a developer market in which firms hire developers to create software products. The product market is a vertically differentiated duopoly of ex-ante identical software firms who choose product quality and prices. A product's quality is a function of its feature and usability components. Depending on the terms of the open source license, the firm may or may not be required to publicly release the features it develops. In a private features market, a product's feature component is the sum of the open source features and any additional features the firm develops, which are not made public. In contrast, under a shared features market, features that firms develop must be contributed to open source, so a product's feature component is the sum of the open source features and any additional features developed by both firms. A shared features market can enable either firm to completely free-ride on the features contributions of the other firm.
On the other hand, usability improvements are always kept private; firms do not have access to a competitor's usability components regardless of the license or market. In the developer market, firms hire developers to create more functionality (features) for their products. However, when facing a market of developers, firms do not know whether a developer has the appropriate skills and face the problem of identifying capable developers. Open source provides a mechanism for high-skilled developers to signal their skill or type to firms by contributing features to open source.
Such contributions can provide a credible signal to firms about skills and provide an economic rationale for the seemingly puzzling observation that developers make these contributions freely. We demonstrate how the puzzles raised earlier in this section result from the competitive strategies of COSS firms across the product and developer markets, and compare the models' equilibrium outcomes in the shared features and private features markets. Our key results, mirroring the puzzles, are the following.
First, in the shared features market, we find that free-riding on features is supported in equilibrium: the (ex-post) high quality firm creates additional open source features and the low-quality firm does not. However, both firms develop positive levels of usability. The intuition is that the high-quality firm contributes to open source because the complementary nature of features and usability increases the value of differentiating on usability, and firms can appropriate the benefits from quality differentiation. The low-quality firm has less of an incentive to contribute features for two reasons: it can free-ride on the high-quality firm and its marginal value of additional features is lower because it develops less usability. This free-riding outcome is consistent with empirical findings that the high-quality Red Hat Inc. contributes significantly more code to Linux than any other competing vendor like Novell (Pal and Madanmohan, 2002; SD-Times, 2008) .
Second, comparing product quality across the markets, we find quality can be higher in the presence of free-riding in the shared features case, because reduced competition between firms in the developer market lowers the cost of quality for the firms. This effect is stronger when the 4 In the Appendix, we show the erroneous outcomes that result if we ignore the developer market.
market is large and signaling is costly for developers.
Third, open source contributions can be lower when firms are required to make public their improvements to the open source software (i.e., the shared features market). The intuition is that developers expect competition between firms for their skills to result in higher wages, which means their incentives to signal are higher and more open source features are created. This effect is especially strong when the market size is large.
Fourth, both consumers and the low-quality firm are unambiguously better off in the free-riding shared features market compared to the private features market. Under certain conditions, the high quality firm may also earn higher profits in the shared features market. Consumer surplus is higher in the free-riding case because of increased price competition that in turn results from reduced product differentiation.
From a methodological viewpoint, our paper draws on two distinct streams of research that have remained disparate. Our formulation of the product market derives from work in marketing and industrial organization on strategic product development with vertically differentiated firms (Shaked and Sutton, 1982; Moorthy, 1988) . More recent work in this area incorporates, for example, search costs (Kuksov, 2004) and channel considerations (Luo et al., 2007) . However, none of this work considers products that are a combination of public and private goods as is the case with commercial open source software. Competing firms may leverage open source software to enhance their own products. This unique development process alters the incentives of firms' product design decisions compared to more standard settings (e.g., ?) where a product's components are entirely proprietary. Moreover, the commercial open source software market is growing rapidly and has many strategic ramifications for the regular software market (Economist, 2009) . We believe our framework helps marketing scholars understand an area with significant conceptual differences that have a strong impact on competitive marketing strategies and which determine the amount of the public good created in the first place.
The second stream of literature inspires our formulation of the developer market, in which heterogeneous developers contribute to open source to signal their quality to firms. The key requirement is that the signal credibly convey information about a developer's skill level, so that a low-skilled (low-ability) developer would not be able to replicate the signal of the high-skilled developers. This idea was first used in Spence (1973) , where workers signal through investments in education to perfectly competitive firms, in contrast to our imperfectly competitive market with signal spillovers. This setting applies specifically to open source markets and more broadly to any market firms may incorporate individuals' public signals into their own products. is Leppamaki and Mustonen (2003) , which examines the strategy of a monopolist firm that hires developers to create a competing open source product. The model assumes a perfect market for developers, ignores the multi-dimensional aspect of quality, and does not consider strategic interaction between the firms and developers.
Related to our formulation of the developer market, several studies in the literature consider developers' motivation to contribute to open source projects, including signaling incentives (Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Hertel et al., 2003) , "ego gratification" due to peer recognition (Hars and Ou, 2002) , and can be expanded to include studies on altruism (Andreoni, 1990) that are not limited to our context. We focus on the motivation due to signaling incentives motivations two reasons.
First, signaling incentives have the most direct relationship to, and are more easily affected by, firms' competitive strategies compared to the alternative explanations, i.e., it is difficult to imagine how a firm would influence the altruism a developer feels for contributing to open source.
Second, the signaling motivation has received wide support both in the literature and anecdotally. 5 For example, in a survey of open source developers, Hars and Ou (2002) report that a majority explicitly refer to job-related concerns as a motivation for contribution. 6 Contributing to open source projects is a strong job market signal because potential employers can review a developer's contributions (Leppamaki and Mustonen, 2003) . In their review article, Lerner and Tirole (2002) argue that much of the evidence concerning developers' motivations to contribute to open source is consistent with an economic perspective: career concerns and future rewards through gains in reputational capital serve as strong motivating factors.
The Open Source Industry
The open source movement gained prominence in the 1990s as a small community of expert developers who made the source code to their programs freely available for anyone to use and modify.
In contrast to freely available but closed software products like Adobe Reader, opening up the source code allows users to modify and alter the software. 6 Two other papers in support of the signaling motivation deserve mention. First, J.A. Roberts and Slaughter (2006) show in a study of the Apache Web Server, an early and large OSS project, that an increase in a developer's performance ranking was associated with an increase in the developer's status motivations to participate, which supports their argument that participation is consistent with the economic signaling motivation. Second, using a unique data set on developers' participation across many OSS projects, Fershtman and Gandal (2007) find the output per contributor is higher when the licenses are less restrictive and more commercially oriented. The authors conclude these results support the idea that employment signaling plays a key role in developers' OSS participation decisions. has been rapid: market researcher IDC (2007) it makes to Linux, but can keep any usability enhancements private. Red Hat makes significant contributions to the Linux kernel, the Linux X Windows System, the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC), and others, all of which are made public under Linux's license (Pal and Madanmohan, 2002; Software Development Times, 2008) . Red Hat provides customers with additional services, such as extensive documentation, installation and maintenance, and support programs that are available to customers who purchase their commercial product.
Numerous firms have, or continue to, adopt the COSS model, and COSS products now span a wide range of applications from productivity suites to business intelligence to customer-relationship management. 9 Industry professionals clearly recognize that building upon open source is a novel business strategy (Goldman and Gabriel, 2005; Riehle, 2007) . Despite significant commercial interest in the COSS market, the academic literature lacks a model that jointly captures the incentives of developers to contribute to open source and of firms to build COSS products. We present such a model in the next section that focuses on the private features market, and extend it to examine the shared features market in Section 4.
The Private Features Market
We model a duopoly of ex-ante identical firms competing in two separate but interconnected markets: the first is a product market in which consumers purchase software produced by the firms, and the second is a developer market in which firms compete for developers. Our model of the product market builds on earlier work of vertical differentiation (Shaked and Sutton, 1982; Moorthy, 1988) in which firms choose product quality, and we incorporate the unique aspects of the COSS industry that significantly alter firms' competitive strategies. The sequence of stages in our model, common to all market specifications, are detailed in Figure 1 . One exception is Stage 2S, which is only relevant to the shared features market, which we examine in Section 4. 
Model
Product Market: Consumers and Firms
Consumers choose whether to purchase one unit of software from either of the COSS firms or not purchase a product, in which case they receive a normalized utility of zero. 10 Consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for quality, and a consumer indexed by θ has utility for a software Wage schedule in the developer market, with e ∈ {e L , e H } product of quality q at price p given by:
Consumers' marginal valuation for quality is distributed uniformly, θ ∼ U[0, M ], and its realized value determines which product is preferred by the consumer.
The quality q of a software product depends on its level of features F and its level of usability s. We follow industry practice and view these dimensions as mutually exclusive (Boehm, 1981; Pressman, 2004) . Quality is defined by the production function:
A software product's features define the set of tasks that can be accomplished with the product, whereas usability refers to the ease with which a consumer can make use of the product's features.
Consumers value both having more features and greater usability. However, an abundance of features may create an overly complex product. Without a sufficient level of usability, consumers may not be able to take advantage of all the features. Conversely, a high level of usability is more beneficial in conjunction with a large number of features. 11 We therefore model these two dimensions of quality as (imperfect) complements, implying
that captures this complementarity and is concave in both features and usability is Cobb-Douglas: The firm also develops the usability of the product to level s j by investing in technical support, documentation, online help, etc. that make the product's functionality easier to use. The overall quality of firm j's product is
The firms hire developers at a wage of w and the marginal cost of creating usability is c s . 12 Marginal 11 In general, consumers do not benefit from products with a significant imbalance between their level of features and usability. Thompson et al. (2005) shows that consumers who purchase overly complex products face "feature fatigue" and that improving usability can help consumers effectively utilize the features.
12 We focus on the labor market for feature developers because creating new functionality is a more specialized and costs of production are zero because software is an information good. The total fixed production cost C(f, s) is simply the sum of the cost developing features and of making the product more usable, and is given as:
Firms may produce products of different quality, and we denote firm 1 as the higher-quality firm, letting q 1 > q 2 without loss of generality.
Market for Developers
Developers are heterogeneously distributed, and are either high-skilled (high-type) or low-skilled Roberts and Slaughter, 2006; Hars and Ou, 2002) . Equivalently, we could assume there is a perfectly competitive market for usability developers, who are inelastically supplied at some exogenous wage. Our analysis and results would be identical in this case. 13 No further assumptions on the functional form of Ψ are required for our results. We use the general form in our description since it helps in presenting and interpreting different effects.
source project can receive an offer from a firm like Oracle that is not a primary competitor in the Linux market. Therefore, the external demand, D(w), is a function of the market wage, and affects market outcomes only in the sense that it affects the wage by creating an additional source of demand for high-skilled developers. Note that the external market has no demand for developers who have not signaled, since their skill-level is uncertain. Figure 3 displays the developer market and its link to the product market. The numbers correspond to the stages in the game outlined in Figure 1 at the start of Section 3. First, developers form expectations about wages based on the market, and contribute to open source to signal their skill level to firms. Second, these contributions are publicly observable, and firms use them to evaluate developers' skills and make wage offers to developers. 14 Firms simultaneously hire developers and in doing so, they choose their product's level of features and usability. Third, firms compete in the product market.
Low-type developers may attempt to masquerade as high-type developers to convince firms to hire them. Open source projects have "gatekeepers" who screen for low-quality code and decide which submissions to include in the project (Bagozzi and Dholakia, 2006) . Gatekeepers ensure that high-type developers have an incentive to contribute more to open source to separate themselves from the low-types. To simplify our exposition, we make two assumptions. First, low-type developers have a fixed reservation option R L = 0, and second, we normalize the low-type developer's skill-level to η L = 0. These assumptions make it unprofitable for firms to hire the low-types, but both conditions could be relaxed to yield qualitatively similar results. 15 We drop the subscript on η H , and refer to it as η, because only high-type developers' skill-level influences the equilibrium. Note: The expected and actual wage schedules are the same due to rational expectations in equilibrium. The numbers in the diagram correspond to the p q g p stages of the game, as outlined at the beginning of Section 3. If a developer signals by contributing e features to open source, her wage is w(e). A developer of type t ∈ {L, H} contributing e features receives utility u t (w, e) = w(e) − c t e and her optimal contribution level is:
subject to the incentive compatibility (IC) and individual rationality (IR) conditions:
In general, the IR and IC constraints must hold in all separating equilibria. 16 To ensure separation, high-type developers must find it incentive compatible to exert a high level of effort (IC H ) and must be sufficiently compensated to work for the COSS firms given her reservation option (IR H ). Lowtype developers must find it prohibitively expensive to imitate the high-type developers (IC L ).
In this setting, however, the low-type's IR constraint does not need to be satisfied because not participating is equivalent to making a zero contribution. Firms do not find it optimal to hire low-type developers at any positive wage after their type is revealed, leading them to set w(e L ) = 0.
Given that the wage for low-type developers never exceeds their reservation wages (in any separating equilibrium), they do not contribute to open source, implying that e L = 0. Therefore, the individual rationality condition for low-type developers, IR L , does not need to be satisfied. The condition 
whereas the number of low-type developers who signal positively is f L = 0. Since only high-types signal, we also denote the number of developers who contribute by
This condition characterizes the supply of developers available for hire either by the firms or by the external market. Given an arbitrary wage w, the initial level of open source features available in Stage 1, F 0 (w), is a function of the number of developers and their contributions:
Note the IR and IC conditions are necessary, but not sufficient, to determine the equilibrium wage since they only reflect developer decisions at a fixed wage. We must know the demand for developers to calculate the market-clearing wage. The wage influences developer contributions and yields different levels of open source features. A higher wage raises initial developer contributions available to the COSS firms. This alters the firms' incentives to invest further in product quality, and reduces their need to hire additional developers. The returns to quality also depend on the structure of the product market, i.e., private features versus shared features. Thus, we must account for competition between the firms for developers and the nature of the product market.
Discussion and Comparison
We briefly discuss and compare the role of signaling in our model to prior work. In the canonical model of Spence (1973) , workers signal through investments in education to a market of perfectly competitive firms, and workers capture all the surplus. where an individual's educational investment only benefits the employer. Signaling by a developer not only affects that developer's utility and the COSS firm that hires him, but it also changes the strategic interaction between the COSS firms in the market. These conflicting incentives create a critical and unique link between the product and developer markets.
In sum, we generalize the basic job market signaling model to an imperfectly competitive market with publicly appropriable signals. Next, we characterize the equilibrium interaction between the product and developer markets.
Equilibrium Analysis
We analyze the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the model. We examine the firms' product design Intermediate results that are not central to our analysis appear as Lemmas in the Appendix.
Pricing Equilibrium
The pricing subgame in Stage 3 applies to all cases of the product market.
We define consumer θ 12 to be indifferent between firm 1 and firm 2's products, such that
Consumer θ 20 is indifferent between purchasing firm 2's product and not purchasing either firm's product, such that θ 20 q 2 − p 2 = 0. The market size for the firms are:
Firms set prices to maximize revenues, which are a function of the product prices and qualities and the market size, leading to optimal revenues:
The optimal price for each firm is a best response of the price set by the other firm, and depends on the quality levels of both products. Thus, the revenues are a function of product quality levels chosen by the firms in Stage 2. This formulation assumes a fixed wage for feature development that affects quality decisions, and the question of how that wage is determined is addressed next.
Firm revenues, prices, and the consumer surplus are represented as functions of product quality levels in Lemma 1. 17 This establishes the outcomes of the pricing sub-game conditional on quality decisions made in Stage 2. Factors such as wages, costs, and market characteristics (shared features or private features) determine revenue and prices through quality levels chosen by the firms in the previous stage, and the pricing subgame does not directly depend on these factors. We proceed to characterize the equilibrium of Stage 2 of the game, how firms make product design choices of features and usability, and evaluate how that affects quality.
Product Quality Equilibrium
The solution of the sub-game in Stage 2 requires the firms to strategically determine the optimal mix of features and usability. Both firms simultaneously determine their product features and usability,
and hence product quality. The profit functions are derived by substituting the feature and usability levels into the revenue functions in Lemma 1 and accounting for the costs of development. This provides the partial-equilibrium responses by the COSS firms given (1) an arbitrary wage in the developer market and (2) an arbitrary level of open source features.
We collapse the Stage 2 sub-game involving two strategic quality components to one overall quality level for each firm. If a firm's best response quality only depends on the overall quality of its competitor's product and not the specific mix of usability and features, then the firm will minimize the cost of attaining a given quality level through an optimal mix of usability and features.
Lemma 2 in the Appendix establishes such a result, allowing us to solve for the equilibrium levels of features and usability, detailed below.
Proposition 1. [Private Features Product Market]
In the private features market with firms vertically differentiated, each firm develops both usability and features. Specifically, given F 0 open source features initially available and that wage w in the developer market is not excessively high, firm j will choose quality and its components to be:
for j ∈ {1, 2}, where the constants φ 1 and φ 2 are defined in the Appendix. No symmetric equilibrium exists in which firms choose the same quality, q 1 = q 2 .
Both firms create features in addition to the freely available open source features F 0 . Firms reduce the number of features they develop when there are more open source features, since these are substitutes. We find that firms differentiate their products more on the less expensive dimension of quality, implying that if features are less expensive to produce, the firms will differentiate more on features (f 1 −f 2 > s 1 −s 2 ). Intuitively, firms differentiate their products more on the dimension that yields a greater return to such differentiation. Note that wages are the only endogenous variable in the result above, determined by the interaction between the developer and product markets.
All the other parameters are exogenous. Next we examine the developer market equilibrium to determine the wage.
Developer Market Equilibrium
The wage level influences the firms' demand for high-type developers, the number of developers willing to signal, and the level of their contributions to open source. The equilibrium wage must balance firms' demand for developers with the supply of developers who are willing to enter the market by signaling. We focus on separating equilibria where high-type and low-type developers make different contributions to open source software.
We start with the supply side, establishing the conditions required for the high-type and low-type developers to separate. For a separating equilibrium in the signaling game, we must identify conditions on the wage schedule that lead to positive contributions by some high-type developers and that ensures that low-type developers do not find it rational to imitate them. The following result provides the necessary conditions for a least-cost separating (LCS) equilibria in terms of the wage and open source contributions.
Proposition 2.
[Separating Equilibrium] The separating equilibria for the signaling game between the developers and firms is characterized by the following conditions where r is the reservation utility of a developer and w is the market wage for a developer who is known to be high-type:
(i) The necessary conditions for contributions for each developer type are:
(ii) In a least-cost separating (LCS) equilibrium, the high-type developers contribute e LCS H (r, w) and the common out-of-equilibrium beliefs µ(H|e, w) for firms are
This LCS equilibrium is the only equilibrium that satisfies the Intuitive Criterion. Each equilibrium is equally valid without imposing further restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
Part (ii) establishes the out-of-equilibrium beliefs that satisfy the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) to determine a unique LCS equilibrium. Signaling models often admit a multiplicity of equilibria, and we use the Intuitive Criterion to refine 'unreasonable' equilibria. In our context, least-cost refers to the minimum separation required at each prevailing wage. This purification of out-of-equilibrium beliefs requires that any observed deviation from the equilibrium path will more likely be from the type that could profit the most from the deviation. This refinement gives us the minimum contribution to open source high-type developers must make to sustain a separating equilibrium, and the corresponding wage firms must pay to guarantee separation.
Part (iii) focuses on the minimum amount of separation given by e LCS (w) = Developers who have credibly demonstrated their high skill-level by signaling can either work for the COSS firms or for an external market. The external market has a demand D(w) that depends on the wage, and captures the fact that the skills can be useful in firms other than the COSS firms. We observe that the number of high-type developers that firm j wishes to hire at wage w is f j (F 0 (w), w). The equilibrium wage w P in the private features market equates the firms' demand in addition to the external demand for high-type developers to the aggregate supply of developers who prefer signaling to their reservation option. Below this wage level, fewer high-type developers will contribute to open source than firms are willing to hire, and above this wage level more developers will be inclined to contribute than firms desire to hire. Thus, the equilibrium wage serves to balance the signaling incentives of developers and firms, and explicitly links the product and developer markets. Lemma 3 in the Appendix details how this wage is determined by equating developers signaling with the demand from Proposition 1. We focus on the properties of the equilibrium wage level next, specifically the comparative statics with respect to the market size, the cost of signaling, and the cost of producing usability.
Proposition 3. The least-cost separating equilibrium wage for high-type developers satisfies the following properties: It is increasing in market size ( 
The Shared Features Market
We alter the model from the previous section to accommodate the shared features case. In the shared features market, the structure of the developer market stays the same but the product market changes to account for the fact that firms must share with competitors any features that they develop. Firms have to make an additional decision on how many features to copy from their competitor, corresponding to Stage 2S in the sequence of events. We examine how the model and equilibrium outcomes change as a result.
Model
The key difference between the shared features market and the private features market presented earlier is the formulation for product quality. To see this distinction most clearly, compare the two panels of Figure the fraction that firm j copies from its competitor. The quality is thus defined in Stage 2S to be:
where firm j hires f j features developers and chooses s j usability similar to the private features market. The difference between the quality here and in the private features market is the extra δ j (ηf −j ) term due to the shared features market that forces mandatory sharing. The rest of the product market in the shared features case is identical to the private features market. However, this extra term fundamentally alters the strategic interaction and equilibrium outcomes as we demonstrate below.
Equilibrium Analysis
Unlike the private features market, we cannot uniquely characterize a firm's best response using overall product quality. Lemma 2 does not apply because each firm's feature contribution directly affects the quality of the other firm's product. The potential for free-riding on features leads to decreased product differentiation and increased price competition, making it unclear whether any firm will contribute to features in equilibrium. The following result provides the outcome for a market where consumers place sufficient value on quality such that firms develop additional features beyond those supplied by open source.
Proposition 4. We find that when COSS firms compete in the shared features market:
(i) Both firms will copy features developed by their competitor to the maximum extent possible (δ 1 , δ 2 = 1).
(ii) The features, usability, and overall quality levels in this partial equilibrium with open source features F 0 and wage w are:
where the constants σ 1 and σ 2 are defined in the Appendix.
First, the outcome of Stage 2S, where firms determine how much to copy, results in complete copying. Partial copying might seem like an alternative that creates more features differentiation and hence more product differentiation. We consider each firm separately to understand this result.
For the high-quality firm, copying more is always better since that increases both its own quality as well as quality differentiation (q 1 − q 2 ) between the firms. For the low-quality firm, copying more increases its own quality but reduces quality differentiation. However, the positive effect of increase in quality dominates the negative effect of reduction in differentiation when the quality levels are sufficiently apart from each other. In anticipation of these effects, the low-quality firm invests less in usability in Stage 2, so that it is advantageous to fully copy features from the high-quality firm.
We find that only the high-quality firm develops features beyond the open source features F 0 available due to developer contributions. The low-quality firm completely free-rides on the features provided by the high-quality firm. Why does the high-quality firm develop a positive level of features? The intuition comes from the fact that the quality dimensions are complements, implying consumers' marginal utility of usability is increasing in the level of features. Although features do not contribute directly to product quality differentiation, they do magnify the effect of usability differences between the firms. Note that the low-quality firm invests less in usability than the high-quality firm, and the high-quality firm develops features to enhance the degree of product differentiation, which results from having a higher usability product. Thus, the increase in the differentiation from usability makes it worth creating features that reduce the intensity of competition.
The product market outcome above has a critical implication for the developers' market: only the high-type firm hires developers because the low-type firm does not develop features (f 2 = 0).
Thus, the high quality firm faces lower competition in the developer market, with only the external market offering a credible alternative to developers who choose to signal. The equilibrium properties and comparative statics of the wage in the shared features market are similar to those in the private features market detailed in Proposition 3 and are omitted for brevity.
Comparison of Market Structures
We have derived equilibria under two types of COSS markets: private features and shared features.
In each case, ex-ante identical firms compete in product and developer markets and are differentiated ex-post. We focus on how profits, product qualities, and price levels compare across these regimes.
Competition between firms in the private features market drives wages higher, and w S < w P as we expect (Lemma 4 in the Appendix (i) The private features market provides the lowest quality level. For small (large) market size and low (high) signaling costs, the private features market also provides the highest quality product.
(ii) The usability ratio
is always larger for the shared features market compared to the private features market, and the features ratio
is larger under the private features market. The quality differentiation captured by the ratio
is higher for the private features market compared to the shared features market.
The low-quality firm's quality is always higher in the shared features market since the firm is able to free-ride on the features provided by the high-quality firm. This effect holds even when the low-quality firm develops a lower level of usability than in the private features market, and is independent of the model parameters, such as market size or signaling costs. In fact, as the market size increases, the quality difference of the low-quality firm compared across the private features and shared features markets becomes larger.
The effect of the market regime on the high-quality firm's quality level is more nuanced: it depends on the market size, signaling cost, and cost to develop usability. When the market size is large and usability costs are low, there is higher demand for developers and lower cost of developing a higher quality product, which increases the equilibrium wage high-type developers receive. These effects are collectively stronger for the shared features market than in the private features market;
therefore, the quality level chosen by the high-quality firm is higher in the shared features market.
This effect is stronger when the signaling cost is higher for the high-type developers, which leads to increased competition between the firms in the private features market. In contrast, when the conditions above are reversed, the high-quality product is better under the private features market.
The marginal benefit of usability increases with the level of public contribution of features, which implies that more signaling by programmers increases the firms' incentives to develop usability. In the shared features market, firms differentiate more on usability, but this differentiation is insufficient to overcome the fact that both products have the same level of features because features are publicly available. The quality differentiation in the shared features market is therefore lower than in the private features case. Prices are proportional to quality levels by Lemma 1. Next, we evaluate the level of surplus consumers and firms obtain in both markets.
Result 3. [Profits and Consumer Surplus]
Examining the creation and distribution of surplus across firms and consumers, we find that:
(i) The high-quality firm can make a higher profit under the shared features market, when the external demand for developers is high.
(ii) Consumer surplus is higher in the shared features market compared to the private features market under all market conditions.
The high-quality firm may make a higher profit because a higher external demand indicates a broad base of developers contributing to open source, implying that competition between the COSS firms may not drive wages up much. A high external demand also increases the wage, but the highquality firm reduces its contribution to features, which also lessens the impact of free-riding. In such a situation, the high-quality firm can do better under a shared features market.
The result in (ii) is surprisingly general and does not depend on the parameters. From the consumers' perspective, the shared features market is preferred, and socially-conscious contributors should consider licensing their software under a framework that makes features publicly available.
This result is counterintuitive: a reduction in competition for developers by firms increases surplus to consumers. The reasoning is that both the utility of the signal (open source features) used in the products developed by the firms and decreased competition in the developers market due to free-riding on features by the low-quality firm serve to benefit consumers. This implies that contrary to Ballmer's notion that a mandatory sharing license is a "cancer that attaches itself...", we find such a requirement may benefit both consumers and firms.
Limitations and Extensions
The OSS market is a fascinating industry in which to examine the product strategies of firms.
As usual, to conduct such an analysis in the context of a formal model entails making numerous simplifying assumptions and abstractions. This section discusses several limitations of the current model and highlights avenues for future research. as open source may also be a strategy that firms use to limit entry, in the sense of Milgrom and Roberts (1986) . However, in many markets firms cannot choose the license-open source developers choose a product's license when they create it, and then a firm builds upon that product taking the license as given. This is the case with Red Hat Linux: the firm had to obey the GNU license that was in place to create its COSS product. Our paper focuses on a setting that describes the vast majority of open source markets. We believe the other cases are well beyond the scope of the present paper, but represent potentially interesting cases to explore in the future.
Second, firms face a variety of "market entry"-type decisions. Should a firm release their own software to the public, and if so, which license should they adopt? The license choice is likely to affect subsequent product develop decisions and could ultimately play a large role in the eventual success of the product. Similarly, if a firm faces the choice of entering one of multiple open source markets (e.g., private features versus shared features markets), which market should it enter? If these markets are distinct and competitor's entry decisions are ignored, then the model in this paper could apply separately to each market setting. 18 However, if there is a link between the markets through either demand (e.g., the products are substitutes) or supply (e.g., product development efficiencies), then such considerations must be taken into account in an expanded multi-market entry model. The current model examines an individual open source market without focusing on whether specific firms will enter, instead studying the equilibrium implications for firms who already have entered. It may be possible to simplify certain aspects of the current model to construct a more elaborate model of the license regime choice.
Third, the incentives of firms to contribute to open source are more complicated in multi-product or forward-looking settings. One reason a multi-product firm may contribute to open source is that it weakens its competitor in another market. This theory implies one motivation behind IBM's contributions to Linux, or Sun's contribution to OpenOffice, could be a desire to reduce Microsoft's market dominance (and revenues) and to enable each firm to compete more effectively. A second 18 Modeling the regime entry game between two firms is a challenge. To allow firms to choose which regime to enter, we could expand our model by creating a super game where in the firms first choose between the private features market, shared features market, or to keep the product completely proprietary. Doing so poses both conceptual and analytical challenges. Many firms in the real world do not change these strategies substantially over a reasonable period of time. Apple's strategy is strictly closed source while Google has adopted a mostly open source strategy, and both firms have consistently upheld these strategies over time. One could speculate that reputation effects seem to dominate any potential gain arising from periodically changing the strategy. Moreover, firms enter the market at different points of time; entrants are likely to respond strategically to the licensing choice of an incumbent. Therefore, any useful analysis of the selection of the software regime also entails the order and timing of entry of the market. Such a formulation will result in a largely intractable model. Doing so, within our model, is beyond the scope of this paper but can be a useful direction for further research.
reason is that many COSS firms draw significant revenue from services that are separate from their products but that leverage their expertise. These services help firms subsidize the cost of developing COSS products in the present given the expectation of revenue in the future from the sale of services, add-ons, or other complementary products. A firm could also alter its open source production decisions after learning from the current period's market outcomes.
Fourth, we abstract away from any horizontal differentiation in open source products. Firms may develop software that is not general purpose, but targeted at specific niche segments of users.
For example, some versions of Linux target the embedded or mobile device market, where the focus may be on low-power computation rather than access to high-power functionality. Indeed, Google has developed its Android operating system based on Linux with some of these goals in mind.
There may be two paths for further research, with a simple approach that assumes that the firms are located at different places on a Hotelling line, and with the firms investing in multiple dimensions of quality similar to the present paper. A more sophisticated follow-up would model firms as investing in features or usability to create horizontal differentiation. However, the interpretation of "taste" must be carefully considered since most software functionality has the property of "more is better," making it more apt as a vertical dimension.
Conclusion
We Let q k 1 for k ∈ {S, P } be the high-quality product in either the shared features or private features market. Similarly, let Π k 1 be the profits (revenues) for the ex-post high-quality firm. Imposing an exogenous wage amounts to setting w * to be equal across product market regimes. Substituting this fixed wage into past results, the following orderings for product quality and profits hold:
Proposition 5. Under Assumptions (A1) and (A2), when the developer market is exogenous and the wage is fixed at w, the following results hold under all conditions:
1. The private features market always produces the highest overall quality product with the most features compared to the shared features market q S 1 < q P 1 and f
2. The ex-post high quality firm in the private features market always makes higher profits than in the shared features market
Compared to the full two-sided model, an exogenous wage leads the shared features market to bias the quality of both firms' products lower in equilibrium. As a consequence, the private features market produces the highest quality product and the high-quality firm earns higher profits as a result. In contrast, when we model the developer market, we find that the shared features market can produce higher quality products and can raise both firms' profits and consumer surplus under certain conditions. These comparisons illustrate the significance of integrating the developer market into the model.
Appendix B: Proofs
Denote the uniform pdf and cdf
Lemma 1. In a vertically differentiated duopoly with quality levels q 1 and q 2 , with q 1 > q 2 , the optimal prices are set at:
. The revenues of the firms are
Proof of Lemma 1. The revenues are determined by the product qualities, prices, and the choices of consumers as follows:
Firms focus only on revenue to set prices as quality choices are sunk in the prior stage. The FOCs with respect to price are:
Solving these FOCs simultaneously, we obtain
Substituting these prices in the revenue functions, we obtain the expressions in the proposition.
The consumer surplus with these quality levels is:
Lemma 2. [Quality Decomposition]The optimal level of features and usability to contribute to a quality target q j for firm j when the first stage produces F 0 features due to developers' signaling actions is as follows:
where f j and s j are the optimal levels of features and usability, and C(q) is the minimum cost of obtaining quality q.
Proof of Lemma 2. The firm's problem is (f, s) = argmin f,s wf + c s s subject to the constraint
F 0 +ηf and its solution is arg min f ≥0 wf + c s q 4 F 0 +ηf . The interior solution yields f (q) = q 2 cs ηw − F 0 η and s(q) = q 2 w ηcs . The necessary condition for a corner solution f = 0 to hold is that:
i.e., the wage must be above a certain level. 19 Thus, if wages are not excessive, then we will always have an interior solution given by the proposition, and we focus on that situation. The overall cost of providing quality q with an interior solution is C(q) = wf (q)+c s s(q), so C(q) = 2
Proof of Proposition 1. The profit functions after incorporating the equilibrium strategies in the pricing sub-game are:
The quality decomposition result from Lemma 2 implies we can reduce the duopoly market competition in the private features market as represented by the following profits:
The quality best responses for each firm is given by the solution to these FOCs:
where c = 2 Observe that the LHS is increasing in w.
and q 2 = M φ 2 2 η wcs , where φ 1 and φ 2 are constants. 20 Using these and the optimal quality decomposition results from Lemma 2, we obtain the stated results. We next show that there are no symmetric equilibria of the subgame beginning with Stage 2. Consider any potential symmetric equilibrium characterized by the equilibrium features and usability outcomes f 1 = f 2 = f * and s 1 = s 2 = s * , implying q * 1 = q * 2 . With equal quality levels, the firms will charge equal prices (Lemma 1), and obtain half the market. If the firms charge different prices (say p 1 > p 2 ), all consumers will prefer firm 2's product since the qualities are equal. Further, we demonstrate that both firms charge zero prices. If either firm charges p > 0, its competitor can obtain the entire market by offering a price of p = p − , where > 0 is a small deviation. Recall that costs sunk in Stage 2 do not affect pricing in Stage 3. Therefore, firms earn zero revenue and have positive costs in any symmetric equilibrium. Consider a deviation by firm 2, setting s 2 = s = s * − δ, where δ > 0 is a small deviation. Firm 2 can obtain higher revenues by part (i), and has lower development costs, thereby increasing profits beyond the symmetric equilibrium outcome. Thus, there exists no symmetric equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2. For a separating equilibrium, we need to characterize the conditions on contributions to open source e L and e H for each type of developer. The market wage is w for the high-type developer and 0 for the low-type, where w is determined in equilibrium. Consider the binding constraints IR H and IC L specified in (2). We argued in §3.1 that e L = 0. The IR H condition implies w − c H e H ≥ r for a high-type developer with reservation utility r, imposing the constraint e H ≤ w−r c H for this developer to signal. Given a specific e H and w, only high-type developers with low reservation option, i.e., r < w − c H e H will choose to enter by signaling. These necessary conditions correspond to part (i).
The least-cost separation is achieved by the high type contributing just enough to open source that it deters the low-type from masquerading: e LCS H (w) = w c L and the corresponding belief by the firms to support this behavior, i.e., µ(H|e, w) =
To prove this LCS contribution is an equilibrium for both types, we consider their possible deviations in turn. Suppose the high type deviates from the least-cost contribution to e = e LCS H (w) + , where > 0. The best possible belief for any type at this level e is µ(H|e , w) = 1. For the high type, this deviation to e is 20 The constants are the positive real solutions to the polynomials below:
Therefore, no such deviation contributing beyond e LCS (w) is profitable, and any deviation below e LCS H (w) will result in the firm believing the developer is low-type. These factors imply e LCS H (w) is an equilibrium strategy for the high-types. For the low-type developer, for any e > e LCS H , we have w − c L e < 0 so it is unprofitable even when the firms believe the developer is high-type. Therefore, the low-type will not deviate from e LCS L = 0.
We apply the intuitive criterion for part (ii) to eliminate non-LCS equilibria: Suppose another equilibrium exists where the high type contributes e . This equilibrium requires that firms' beliefs on the equilibrium path are: µ(H|e, w) =      0, e < e 1, e ≥ e . Consider a deviationẽ from the equilibrium path where w c L <ẽ < e . The best possible belief, µ(H|ẽ, w) = 1 is still not sufficient to induce the low-type developers to contributeẽ since w−c Lẽ < 0. Therefore, only the high-type developer could have deviated toẽ, and the intuitive criterion requires the firms to assign beliefs µ(H|e , w) = 1 after observingẽ. This leads to an inconsistent off-equilibrium-path belief and we can therefore eliminates this equilibrium. We can apply this criterion to filter any equilibrium with high type contributing e > e LCS H (w), and the only remaining equilibrium is the least-cost separating equilibrium. In a least-cost equilibrium, the high-type developers who have low reservation utilities signal by contributing, i.e., r <r LCS = w − c H e LCS H (w) = w 1 − 
The equilibrium wage level in the private features market w P is implicitly described by ξ P (w P ) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. At wage w, the demand for high-type developers in the external market is D(w).
The COSS firms create a demand of f 1 (w)+f 2 (w) = M 2 (φ Note that ξ P represents the excess demand for developers at wage w, i.e., the difference between demand and supply. Equating the excess demand to zero at the market wage gives us the equation in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. We apply the implicit function theorem to Equation (9), to examine the effect of a change in c H on w, and find that 
Observe that the numerator is always positive, whereas each of the terms in the denominator is negative. Therefore, the overall effect is positive. We find the comparative statics of wages with respect to c s , η, and M in a similar manner.
Next, we note that ξ P (w S ) > ξ S (w S ) = ξ P (w P ) = 0. Since ξ P is a decreasing function, we find that w P > w S . This result is unaffected by the functional form of the external demand D(w). . We obtain F P >
which holds when w S or w P are high, which in turn occurs when M is large, η is high, or c s or c L is low (from Proposition 3).
Proof of Result 2. For part (i), we obtain the quality levels from Propositions 1 and 4 to find:
w S w P < w S w P . We know the final fraction is less than 1 since w S < w P from Proposition 4. Comparing the quality levels for the high-quality product in both the shared features and private features markets, we find
w P . For q P 1 > q S 1 , we must have
. This condition can only hold for small market sizes and low signaling costs and proves part (ii).
is immediate from the constants and parameters determining the quality levels.
Proof of Result 3. For (i), the profit of the high-quality firms under different market conditions is: When w S = w P , then we find that Π P 1 > Π S 1 since γ S 1 < γ P 1 . Observe that Π P 1 decreases with w P , but when w P and w S are close then the private features market results in higher profits. One condition when the two wages are close is when there is a high external demand. 
−1
2 . Observe that the term in square brackets is constant, i.e., it only depends on the quality ratio, which is independent of the wage and other model primitives but depends on the market structure, i.e., shared features or private features. We know that when the wages are identical CS S (w) > CS P (w) and the surplus increases with the quality level, which decreases with wage. Since w S < w P , the surplus inequality will also hold at the equilibrium wage.
Proof of Proposition 5. For the low-quality firms, the profits under different markets can be derived from the equilibrium quality levels as:
where the constants are defined as: γ S 2 = σ 1 σ 2 (σ 2 −σ 1 )(σ 5 2 +σ 2 1 (16σ 3 2 −1)+σ 1( σ 2 −8σ 4
2 )) √ σ 1 −σ 2 (4σ 1 −σ 2 ) 3 and γ P 2 = φ 2( φ 1 (8φ 2 −1)φ 2 −φ 3 2 −φ 2 1 (16φ 2 −1)) 2(φ 2 −4φ 1 ) 2 . The low-quality firm has a higher profit under shared features than the private features market with the same wage since γ S 2 > γ P 2 . Since w P > w S from Proposition 4, the firm always has a higher profit in the shared features market.
The profits of the high-quality firms are compared in the proof of Result 3. When w S = w P , then we find that Π P 1 > Π S 1 since γ S 1 < γ P 1 . Observe that Π P 1 decreases with w P , which is higher when the market size M is large, or when signaling becomes difficult (c H is high). These conditions therefore result in lower profits for the high-quality firm in the private features setting.
Part (ii) is proved in the Proof of Result 3.
